Developed economies, experiencing concomitant declining fertility and rising educational attainment, have introduced policies to boost fertility. We model substitution of bought in services for parental time in the rearing and education of children in an economy where technological progress leads households to choose fewer, but better educated, children. We analyse the e¤ects on fertility and education of a baby bonus, paid maternity leave and child care subsidies. We establish conditions under which either maternity or child care bene…ts are more e¢ cacious in raising fertility, and we establish that a lump sum baby bonus will increase fertility only if the bonus increases faster than income per capita. Policies that stimulate fertility also raise parental investment in education.
Introduction
Birth rates and fertility have become part of the Australian economic policy debate since the release of the Treasury's …rst Intergenerational Report in 2003. This report drew attention to the …scal implications of a population where the average age is expected to increase over the next few decades due to both increasing longevity and decreasing fertility. The focus of the report and initial policy discussion concentrated on the economic implications of demographic change, but more recently interest has moved to the question of whether government policy can actually reverse the long-run decline in fertility. Such interest has been spurred by the observation that such a reversal is actually occurring.
The recent upturn in Australian fertility has caused some commentators to suggest that it is due to the introduction in 2004 of the 'Baby Bonus' 1 and the then Federal Treasurer's exhortation to Australian women.
The former treasurer's call for Australian couples to have another child "for the country" appears to have paid o¤, with a spike in the birth rate. The number of births in Australia every year has been knocked out of a rut which had continued since the mid 1990s, when between 255,000 and 260,000 babies were being born per year. In 2005, the year after then treasurer Peter Costello introduced the $3,000 baby bonus along with a parental call to arms, the birth rate climbed to 272,000. Rose (2009) There has indeed been an increase in births, but it makes more sense to measure the birth rate relative to the female population of child-bearing age rather than just the number of births. The time path of the total fertility rate (births per woman) since 1925 is shown in Figure 1 2 where it can be seen that the increase in fertility started in 2002, well before the introduction of the Baby Bonus.
A more careful assessment of the impact of the Baby Bonus on the birth rate comes from Drago, Sawyer, She-er & Wooden (2009) using an econometric model which produces estimates of a bonus-inspired rise between 0.7% and 3.2%. Starting with the 2003 fertility rate of 1.75 births per woman, these predicted rises attributable to the Baby Bonus would have taken the fertility rate to 1.76 or 1.81 respectively, explaining less than one quarter of the observed rise to over 1.99 births per woman in 2008. Guest (2007) argues that the Baby Bonus could have been more e¤ectively targeted if the Australian government had followed the example of Singapore by restricting the payment to second and third children.
Financial child support may not be the only cause of rising fertility. For example, empirical estimates from Feyrer, Sacerdote & Stern (2008) associate a one standard deviation increase in the fraction of housework done by men with an increase in fertility of 0.12 children. An alternative explanation for the recent 'baby bounce-back' comes from Day (2004) who shows that a fertility decline which has resulted from a trend increase in the relative earnings of women, hence the opportunity cost of children, may be reversed eventually if there is su¢ cient substitutability in raising children between maternal time and child-care services. 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Figure 1: Total Fertility Rate A review of trends in Australian fertility has been conducted by Lattimore & Pobke (2008) . They conclude that some of the recent rise in fertility is due to the 'tempo'e¤ect of births to women who had previously delayed child-bearing. They report that if Australian fertility were to have the same sensitivity to family allowances as OECD countries on average, then the change in allowances (including the Baby Bonus) since 1999 would have caused the total fertility rate to rise by 0.07 babies per woman. Although Lattimore & Pobke (2008) (p. XVII) argue that this result is likely to overestimate the impact of family policy in Australia, the magnitude of their predicted impact is strikingly similar to Drago et al.'s (2009) top-end estimate of a Baby Bonus impact of 0.06 births per woman. Lattimore & Pobke (2008) suggest that the current moderate level of Australian fertility is likely to be sustained into the future; the fact that it is slightly below the demographic replacement rate, which is the fertility rate required to keep population stable in the absence of migration, should not be regarded as a matter of concern. They suggest (pp. 101-102) that current Australian public policies that lower the costs of children and that reduce the trade-o¤s between careers and bearing children are important in reducing the risk of a long-run shift to the much lower fertility levels that currently exist in some European countries.
There is further support for the proposition that child assistance is e¤ective in raising fertility. For OECD economies, Feyrer et al. (2008) estimate that doubling government spending on family assistance raises fertility by 0.13 children.
However, caution needs to be exercised when interpreting coe¢ cient estimates. For instance, a negative coe¢ cient on federally mandated paid maternity leave, estimated by Feyrer et al. (2008) for OECD countries, may re ‡ect the endogeneity of pro-natalist policies. That is, countries with low fertility may respond by increasing paid maternity leave.
McDonald (2006) reviews the demographic evidence on the e¢ cacy of public policy and concludes that fertility does respond positively not only to cash payments but also to resources that support women's ability to combine work with raising more than one child. Apps & Rees (2004) argue that subsidies to child care can be more e¤ective than cash grants in increasing fertility (and women's supply of labour). This is a theme that we develop in this paper.
Following the lead of both Apps & Rees (2004) and McDonald (2006) , we propose to model the e¤ects of the two types of family assistance that currently operate in Australia -cash payments and child-care subsidies -and we extend the modelling by including a third type of assistance, soon to be introduced, maternity pay for working mothers. We also introduce the e¤ects of family policy on education of children following the lead of Becker & Lewis (1973) who explore the notion that families choose between the quantity and quality of children, where education is regarded, in somewhat crude economistic terms, as investment in quality.
In the next section we review the literature that has analysed multi-faceted family assistance. We then set out our model which allows us to analyse three types of family assistance in an overlapping generations model of endogenous growth which allows parents to choose both the quantity of children and their quality or level of education.
Review of related models
A central theme to the existing theoretical literature on the relationship between public …nance and family size concerns the socially optimal level of taxation and child support, given interrelations between child rearing, labor supply and the degree of inequality aversion exhibited by the social welfare function (Balestrino, Cigno & Pettini (2002) and Cigno & Pettini (2001) ). The more restrictively positivist approach of this paper is similar to that of Apps & Rees (2004) in that we assume that the government would like to increase fertility and we want to compare and contrast the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent instruments of child support for doing so.
Our analysis di¤ers from Apps & Rees (2004) in three ways. First, we consider a wider set of instruments that includes paid maternity leave. Second, we allow for parents to care about quality, as well as the number of, children. Third, we model household decision making within an endogenously growing economy where technological progress induces households to trade child quantity for quality. The …rst two aspects allow us to explore the di¤erence in e¤ectiveness of maternity bene…ts and child care bene…ts. The latter aspect allows us to distinguish the e¤ects of a lump sum baby bonus from the other two forms of child support. Moreover, by modelling simultaneous decisions over number of children and education, we can also predict the e¤ects of child support on education. Apps & Rees (2004) …nd that, all else equal, raising either child care subsidies or a lump sum baby bonus unambiguously increase fertility. Given the similarity of our modelling assumptions, our results do not fundamentally contradict those of Apps & Rees (2004) . It is not surprising, however, to …nd that our extension to an extra choice variable (education) and extra policy instrument (maternity leave) does lead to some interesting di¤erences. We …nd, for instance, that raising a lump sum baby bonus has an ambiguous e¤ect on fertility. Moreover, the relative e¤ectiveness of raising the rate of maternity bene…t and child care bene…t depends both on the relative e¢ ciency of child care and on prevailing input prices.
We embed our analysis of household choice in an extended version of the model of 'Modern Economic Growth' developed by Galor & Weil (2000) who analyse the interplay between population, technology and human capital. They present a growth model that endogenises the level of education and partially endogenises the rate of technological progress. In brief, rapid technological change raises the rate of return to human capital, inducing a rise in education levels. Higher education levels in turn increase the speed of technological progress. The joint evolution of technological change and education drives economic growth. Rapid technological change induces parents to choose quality (education) over quantity of children. Thus, the population growth for the current generation is inversely related to the education level of the next generation. We extend the Galor & Weil (2000) model by introducing bought in services as an input in both the rearing and education of children and by introducing family policy.
The Model
Consider an overlapping generations model in which people live for two periods: childhood (t 1) and adulthood (t). In childhood, individuals consume both time and goods and services provided by their parents. Parents allocate inputs across number and quality (education) of children. In the second period of life, each individual is endowed with one unit of labour.
Production of Final Output
Following Galor & Weil (1998) , the economy produces a single homogeneous good at time t according to the production function:
where Z t , K t , H t and X denote technology, physical capital, human capital and …xed natural resources, respectively. In a small open economy with perfect capital mobility, capital accumulation has no role in the mechanism for growth.
The production function in per worker terms is
where h t = H t =L t is human capital per worker and x t = J t X=L t is the amount of e¤ective resources per worker at time t.
If there are no property rights over land, factor payments to land are zero. By this simplifying assumption and Euler's Theorem, each worker receives a wage 4 per e¢ ciency unit of labor:
Production of Human Capital
The individual level of human capital is determined by the individual's quality (education) as well as by the technological environment. Galor and Weil (2000) assume human capital is depreciated by (decreasing and convex in) the rate of technological change, g t+1 . The level of human capital of children of members of generation t, h t+1 , is an increasing function of their education, e t+1 , and is depreciated by the rate of progress in the state of technology from period t to period t + 1, g t+1 :
where h e > 0, h ee < 0 and h g < 0, h gg < 0. Education lessens the adverse e¤ect of technological change: h eg > 0.
Household Optimisation
Motivated by intergenerational altruism or transfers from children in old age, households derive direct utility from the aggregate full income of their o¤spring.
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The preferences of members of generation t are represented by the utility function:
where n t is the number of children. 6 r, ; and the other inputs. The production function can be rewritten as:
where the proportionate change in Jt is a …xed multiple of the proportionate change in the original technological parameter, Zt.
With bought in child care and education
In this paper, we want to examine the e¤ects of child support paid to the household in the form of a baby bonus, subsidised child care and paid maternity leave. We need to introduce external services which can be purchased to substitute for parental time in raising and educating children.
In the second period of life, each individual faces the budget constraint:
whereẑ q andẑ e denote the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required to raise a child regardless of quality and for each unit of education per child, respectively;x q andx e denote the services required to raise a child regardless of quality and for each unit of education per child, respectively. Note that we price human capital used in bought in services and parenting at the same rate. Both bought in services and parental time use human capital. However, if bought in services and parental time are priced at the same rate, then the household should be indi¤erent between bought in and parental time. Thus, Galor & Weil (2000) state:
Since all members of a generation are identical in their endowments, the budget constraint is not a¤ected if child quality is produced by professional educators rather than by parents We suggest that whilst members are identical in their human capital endowments, professional child carers and educators di¤er from parents in the productivity of their human capital. Thus, the prices of bought in services and parental time di¤er due to heterogeneous e¢ ciency, incorporated in the general production functions:
which are linear homogeneous, continuously di¤erentiable and strictly quasiconcave and where A(E) and B(D) denote the e¢ ciency of total bought in services and total parental time, z i and x i (i = q; e), respectively, in child rearing (education).
The household's optimal choice of child quantity and quality, derived by maximising (5) subject to (4) and (6) is
where, for the moment, we note thatẑ i (B; D) andx i (A; E). We explicitly solve for the cost minimizing inputs under a system of child support in the following section.
Equation (8) implies the well known child 'quality-quantity trade-o¤', a phrase coined by Becker & Lewis (1973) .
Proposition 1 If child rearing is relatively intensive in parental time, then the elasticity of child quantity with respect to child quality increases with the introduction of bought in child care and education
Proof. The elasticity of child quantity with respect to child quality is
(ẑ q +x q ) + (x e +ẑ e ) e t+1
Note, in their discussion of the quality-quantity trade-o¤, that Galor & Weil (2000) (footnote 9, p. 812) state
If both time and goods are required to produce child quality, the process we describe would be intensi…ed.
The process they describe is one where technological progress expected to occur during a child's lifetime induces a decline in parents' chosen quantity of children and a rise in their quality. Referring to the proof of Proposition 1, the elasticity of child quantity with respect to child quantity intensi…es if both time and goods are required to produce child quality, but only time is required to produce child quality (x q = 0). This is a special case of Proposition 1. In general, the process of declining fertility and rising education intensi…es or attenuates depending relative factor intensities, which in turn depend on e¢ ciency parameters and child support bene…ts, which we now analyse.
With a system of child support
The production function for child rearing is a David & van de Klundert (1965) variant of CES form
where z and x denote total parental time and total bought in child care, respectively, and the positive coe¢ cients A and B represent the levels of e¢ ciency of parental time and bought in child care, respectively. The ratio A=B can be interpreted as returns to specialisation by professional child carers. Alternatively, we could de…ne B = 1= and A = (1 ) 1= , where is a distribution parameter that could be interpreted as measuring the relative factor shares in production. The constant elasticity of substitution between parental care and bought in care is " = 1= (1 ).
7 Klump & Preissler (2000) show that David & van de Klundert (1965) is a CES variant with input augmenting e¢ ciency parameters that follows directly from the de…nition of the elasticity of substitution.
Similarly, the production function for child education is
where z and x denote total parental time and total bought in education (schooling), respectively, and the positive coe¢ cients D and E represent the levels of e¢ ciency of parental time and bought in education, respectively. The ratio E=D can be interpreted as returns to specialisation by professional teachers. Because the production functions for child-rearing and education are homogeneous of degree one, the household optimization problem can be solved in two stages. The household …rst chooses, for a given n t and e t+1 , the cost minimizing input mix and then chooses n t and e t+1 , given the e¢ cient input mix, so as to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint.
Cost minimization
The total cost of rearing children is
where m is the rate of maternity bene…t, is the rate at which child care is subsidized. The household …rst chooses the input mix, for a given n t and a given e t+1 , so as to minimize (12) subject to (10) and (11). Substituting from the input demands in the appendix, the cost of raising a child with no educational attainment as a share of household income is
Utility maximisation In the second period of life, each individual faces the budget constraint:
where is the rate at which consumption is taxed and b is a lump sum "baby bonus" payment per child.
The government raises revenue from taxation on consumption at the rate, . 8 The government budget constraint in per household terms is c t x q n t mz q n t bn t = 0
Each household chooses the number and quality of children, to maximise (5) subject to (15) (17a), household fertility is inversely related to the level of education each child receives. Child support, in the form of a maternity bene…t, child care bene…t and a baby bonus, a¤ect fertility. We analyse the di¤erence in e¤ects in Section 5. By (17b), de t+1 =h t+1 is una¤ected by child support.
By (17a) and (17b), household fertility and the level of education each child receives is una¤ected by household income in the absence of a lump sum baby bonus (b = 0). Intuitively, because household preferences are log utility, the household will allocate proportion of their income to potential income of their children and (1 ) proportion of their income to consumption. To generate potential income of their children, the household switches between quantity and quality of children, depending on the relative return, which is determined by the rate of technological progress expected over the lifetime of the child. We describe this process in the following section. Household income does not in ‡uence the household's choice between quantity and quality of children.
As a portion of household income, the opportunity cost of raising a child is constant. Thus, household income does not e¤ect the individual's choice of total time spent on children and consumption. The income expansion path is horizontal at in terms of time devoted to child rearing.
With the introduction of a lump sum baby bonus, the opportunity cost of raising a child, as a portion of income, rises with income. Whether this has a positive (or negative e¤ect) on household fertility choice depends on whether the baby bonus increases proportionately more (or less) than household income.
we note that the size of the working age population at time t + 1 is
where n t 1 is the rate of population growth. We assume that initially, b = 0, which reduces the dimensionality of the system to be studied.
The evolution of education
Equation (17b) can be rewritten as
where p n (:) = p n (m; ; B; A) and p e (:) = p e (m; D; E). Referring to the appendix, total di¤erentiation of (19) yields an implicit functional relationship between a child's education level (e t+1 ) and technological progress expected to take place between the …rst and second period of a child's lifetime (g t+1 ):
where e 0 (g t+1 ) > 0. We may reasonably assume from diminishing returns to education that this implicit function is also concave: e 00 (g t+1 ) > 0.
The reduced form rate of technological progress is
where g i (e t ; L t ) > 0 and g ii (e t ; L t ) < 0; i = e t ; L t .
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Thus, the evolution of education is described by
The evolution of e¤ective resources
The evolution of e¤ective resources per worker is
Substituting from (21), (17a) and (22) yields
where, under a system of child support paid in the form of maternity and child care bene…ts, the evolution of e¤ective resources per worker is driven by education and working age population size. 
The dynamic system
Thus, the evolution of the economy is governed by a two-dimensional system
To simplify the exposition, we assume, as do Galor & Weil (2000) , that an increase in population size has no e¤ect on technological progress. That is, g L (e t ; L t ) = 0. Thus, we analyse the evolution of x t and e t for a given population size, L.
Analysis of the dynamic system is simpli…ed by the fact that the joint evolution of e t and g t is determined independently of x t . Technology and education evolve over time so as to satisfy in every period t g t+1 = g (e t ; L) (25a) e t+1 = e(g t+1 )
where both functions are increasing and strictly concave.
Proposition 2 For a su¢ ciently large population, the economy converges to a steady state equilibrium with a constant rate of technological progress and constant levels of education (and human capital per worker), g, e, and h, respectively.
Proof. Existence Referring to Figure 2 , a plot of both functions in (g t ; e t ) space reveals that increasing and strict concavity of both functions is not su¢ cient for existence of a steady state equilibrium. Let g 0 and g 1 denote g t+1 = g (0; L) and 0 = e(g t+1 ), respectively. For g t+1 = g (e t ; L) to intersect e t+1 = e(g t+1 ) at positive levels of ( e; g), we require g 0 > g 1 . Recognising that g t+1 = g (e t ; L) shifts up in (g t ; e t ) space with an increase in L, this condition is satis…ed for a su¢ ciently large population, L g . Convergence Referring to Figure 2 , a plot of both functions in (g t ; e t ) space reveals that increasing and strict concavity of both functions is su¢ cient for convergence to a steady state equilibrium.
Corollary 1 (to Proposition 2) In steady state equilibrium, income per capita grows at the rate of technological progress and fertility is constant.
Proof. From the production function, g, e and h ) (y t+1 y t ) =y t = g. From (17a), e ) n.
Types of Child Support
Because this paper focuses on comparing and contrasting the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent forms of child support, we assume initially that any increase in child support payment is …nanced by an increase in the consumption tax rate.
Fertility E¤ects Maternity bene…t and Child Care Bene…ts only
The relevant partial derivatives are, in the absence of a baby bonus,
Dividing (26a) by (26b) and comparing proportionate fertility e¤ects,
which yields the following Proposition 3 (Maternity bene…t versus Child-care bene…t) An increase in m boosts fertility proportionately more than does an equivalent proportionate increase in if and only if m (ẑ q +ẑ e e) > x q That is, fertility responds more to an increase in a maternity bene…t than to a proportionate increase in a child care bene…t when the subsidized time input of raising a child with education, e, exceeds the subsidised amount of bought in child care per child.
Thus, by recognising that a paid maternity bene…t subsidises parental time, used in not only child quantity but also quality, we conclude that a maternity bene…t is a more e¤ective lever in boosting fertility than a child care bene…t.
To both identify critical values satisfying the condition in Proposition 3 and test the robustness of our conclusion, we explore the possibility that parental time devoted to education is relatively small. Consider the case whereẑ e ! 0. To simplify the exposition, we consider the elasticity of fertility with respect to (1 m) and (1 ), respectively:
which, together with the input demands (see appendix), implies that m has greater e¢ cacy than in raising fertility if and only if (1 m)
we can identify a critical value of maternity bene…t, m, for given values of A, B and , or a critical ratio of (1 )= (1 m), for a given relative e¢ ciency of bought in child care, (A=B), which implŷ
Households substitute bought in child care for parental time in child rearing, suggesting 0 < < 1. This corollary suggests that the higher the rate of child care bene…t ( ) and the higher the relative e¢ ciency of bought in child care (A > B), the higher the rate of maternity bene…t required to induce a proportionately larger increase in fertility than that induced by a proportionately equivalent increase in the rate of child care bene…t. The existence of a child care industry suggests A > B. By implication, the higher m relative to , the more likely it is that m is the more e¤ective lever to raise fertility.
To indicate whether the existing maternity bene…t is su¢ ciently high to render it the more e¤ective lever, we provide an illustrative example, which is representative of the Australian economy.
Example 1 Consider an average annual income of $60,000 and a minimum annual income of $30,000. Eighteen weeks paid maternity leave at minimum wages translates to m = $10; 000=$60; 000 = 1=6. An annual child care cost of $15,000 with a government rebate of $7,500 translates to = 1=8.
To the extent that these payments are used to raise fertility, the corollary to Proposition 3 indicates which is the most e¤ective lever. Bought in child care services would have to be less than 5% more e¢ cient than parental time (A < 1:05B), for m to be the more e¤ective lever at the existing rate. To the extent that the relative e¢ ciency of bought in child care exceeds 5%, we can infer that a higher rate of maternity bene…t will render it more e¤ective.
Before drawing too many inferences from this Proposition and its corollary, we should note some critical assumptions. For instance, we model market clearing demand for parental time and bought in child care in child rearing. Importantly, we assume that the supply of bought in child care is elastic. In Australia, as in many European countries, child care markets work di¤erently than in the United States: they are characterized by heavy subsidies, which also means excess demand can lead to a rationing problem. When analysing the responsiveness ofx q =ẑ q to changes in bene…ts and e¢ ciency, we could incorporate a supply constraint in bought in child care (i.e.x q x c ). Under this scenario, m would be lower and we could contrast the e¤ects of reduced rationing and increased rate of child care bene…t on n andẑ q .
Lump Sum Baby Bonus
With the introduction of a baby bonus,
which we summarize with the following Proposition 4 (Lump Sum Baby Bonus) The introduction of a baby bonus (b) is predicted to increase fertility. Any further increase in fertility will require b to be rising faster than y.
In contrast to a maternity bene…t and a child care bene…t, an increase in the lump sum baby bonus has an ambiguous e¤ect on fertility when income per capita is rising. The intuition for this result lies in the fact that a lump sum payment implies the net cost of raising children as a proportion of income rises as household income rises (refer to discussion accompanying (17a) and (17b)). In a steady state equilibrium, household income grows at the rate of technological progress. The implication is that the lump sum nature of the baby bonus, instead of an income related program, may explain why we may expect to see a limited rise in fertility due to the baby bonus payment.
As noted in the previous section, the introduction of a lump sum baby bonus increases the dimensionality of the dynamic system. The dynamic system is outlined in the appendix.
Education E¤ects
By (17b), the steady state level of education, e, will be decreasing in p n (:) and increasing in p e (:):
It is straightforward to show that @p n (:) =@ < 0 and @p i (:) =@m < 0 (i = n; e)., since any rise in input demand due to a reduction in price (for instance, a rise inx q due to a reduction in (1 )) will be less than the reduction price. We summarise this discussion with the following
Proposition 5 An increase in raises the level of education
The e¤ect on e of an increase in m depends on the relative decrease in p n (:) b=y t and p e (:). Since parental education and bought in education are more likely complementary, whereas parental child care and bought in child care are substitutable, we may reasonably intuit that p n (:) will decrease relative to p e (:) when we subsidise parental time:
By (17b), if p n (:) and p e (:) fall by the same proportion, then an increase in m has a positive e¤ect on e. Thus, a disproportionately larger fall in p n (:) is su¢ cient but not necessary for @ e=@m > 0. We summarise this discussion with the following Proposition 6 If 0 < < 1 and 1 < a < 0, then an increase in m raises the level of education Thus, we …nd that increasing child support in various forms also raises the steady state level of education. Speci…cally, increasing the: child care bene…t raises both fertility and education; maternity bene…t raises fertility and raises the level of education if parental time and bought in education are complementary; lump sum baby bonus raises both fertility and education if the baby bonus is rising faster than household incomes.
Our analysis of comparative statics can be extended by relaxing the assumption that any increase in child support is …nanced by an increase in the consumption tax rate. For example, we can analyse the e¤ect of an exogenous increase in maternity bene…t, with parental time input, bought in services and child care subsidies as endogenously determined.
Conclusion
This paper analyses the e¤ects of three forms of child support (paid maternity leave, child care subsidies and a baby bonus) in a model of endogenous fertility in which technological progress induces households to choose fewer, but better educated, children. The comparative static analysis predicts that:
1. Whilst the introduction of a lump sum baby bonus increases fertility, any further increase in fertility would require the lump sum baby bonus to rise faster than household incomes.
2. If parental time is used to rear and educate children, paid maternity leave may be more e¤ective than child care subsidies in raising fertility.
3. The relative e¤ectiveness of child care subsidies and paid maternity leave in raising fertility depends on the relative e¢ ciency of child care and the prevailing rates of subsidy and maternity pay.
4. The three forms of child support increase not only the level of fertility but also the level of education.
Existing theoretical models …nd that, regardless of whether it is the most e¤ective lever, raising the lump sum baby bonus would unambiguously increase fertility (Apps & Rees 2004) . In contrast, we …nd that raising the lump sum baby bonus will have no e¤ect on fertility if the rise is proportionate to the rise in household income. We also …nd that the relative e¤ectiveness of raising the rate of maternity bene…t and child care bene…t depends on the relative e¢ ciency of child care and prevailing input prices. Our …nal prediction that child support also raises the level of education suggests that policies designed to boost fertility may also enhance economic growth. Using our framework to analyse the overall impact of child support policies on economic growth is a challenging, but feasible direction for further research.
A Appendix

A.1 Input Demands
The input demands for parental time and bought in services used in child care and education, respectively, are A.2 Derivation of equation (20) The total derivative of (19) which implies the evolution of the economy is governed by either a two-dimensional system or a three-dimensional system depending on whether or not the initial system of child support comprises a lump sum baby bonus payment.
